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Abstract 
This paper investigates the transformation of ]apanese energy policy in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster， analysing the measures proposed 
and implemented by the Democratic Party of ] apan (DP]) administration 
toward the deregulation of the domestic electricity market. This major policy 
shift occurred as a response to strong public opposition to nuclear energy， which 
forced the DP] government to declare the nuclear phaseout by 2040. The article 
suggests that the mode of ]apan's future energy policy remains uncertain. 
Moreover， under the Liberal Party of ]apan (LDP) cabinet， there is a danger of 
reform being reversed and the nation turning to a nuclear future. 
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Introduction 
“1n order ωρreventルturedisasters，βmdamental r，ゆrmsmust 
takeρlace. These reforms must cover both the structure of the electric 
ρower industry and the structure of the related government and 
regulatoηI agencies as well as the operationρrocesses. ，1) 
In its final report， released on July 23，2011， the Investigation Committee on 
the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations2J criticized Tokyo 
Electric Power Co.， Ltd. (TEPCO) and the government for their handling ofthe 
accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. It did not clearly name 
the actual cause of the disaster that followed the Great Tohoku (East J apan) 
Earthquake and Tsunami on March 11， 2011. A heated debate has been 
provoked by也edifferent emphasises made in the original Japanese language 
report and in its summary in English.3J The English version accentuates the 
speci五csof J apanese culture which allowed improperly close relationships 
between the government's nuclear safety watchdog agencies and nuclear 
power utilities; the rapport permitted the negligence of natural disaster risks 
and resulted in the Fukushima nuclear crisis (referred to as a “made inla，ρan 
disaster). The fundamental causes of the crisis， English report reads，“are to be 
found in the ingrained conventions of J apanese cu加re:OUr reflexive obedience; 
1) The oficial report of Executive summary. The Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independ巴ntInvestigation Commission. The Nationa1 Dict of Japan， 2012. p.l6 
2) For more d巴tailrefer to http・//ajw. asahi. com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/ 
AJ201207240064 and http・// ajw.asahi.com/ article/0311disaster / ana1ysis/ AJ201207240096. 
3) The original document (in Japanese) can be found at http://rebui1djpn.org/fukushimal 
report and excerpts in English at htゆ://naic.goお/en/.
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our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to 'sticking with the program'; 
and our 'insularity'." The original J apanese version cals the Fukushima a “man-
made" disaster implying a regulatory capture， when the relationship between 
the regulators and the regulated was inappropriately c1ose， enabling the 
regulated to subject the regulators to undue pressure and influence. Regulatory 
capture， as the J apanese report puts it is the result of“the complex 
entanglement of political， bureaucratic， and financial interests dating back to the 
heyday of high economic growth". This can be interpreted as a very thinly 
veiled criticism of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ， which dominated 
J apan's politico-industrial world for much of the post-1945 era.4) 
One of the report's major recommendations stresses the necessity for 
deregulation of the country's electriαty transmission and distribution sectors to 
encourage competition. 
Electricity market deregulation typically means privatization of 
state-owned companies， vertical unbundling of utilities， allowing new entry in 
the generation market. establishment of independent system operators 
responsible for reliable grid operation，白1deregulation of electricity prices， etc. 
Accordingly， research on electricity market deregulation addresses the issues 
of market structure， market design， competition and resulting from them 
production e田ciencyand equilibrium prices (Knittel 2003; Bushnell et al. 2004; 
Walsh and Todeva 2006; Bye and Hope 2005; Hogan 2008). The peculiarities of 
electricity， however， make it a complex commodity. Frequent ine宜Icienciesand 
position abuses by major market players have solidified the notion that 
4) Shimazu， N.， 2012. The Fukushima report hides behind the cultural curtain. The 
Guardian. J uly6. http://www. guardian. co. uk/ commentisfree/2012/juI/06/fukushima-re-
port-disaster-japan?INTCMP=SRCH 
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absolutely free electricity rnarkets are dificult to achieve. 
1n public utilities. “the organization and rnanagement is for the rnost part・
private but the central economic decisions are subject to direct governmental 
regulation" (Kahn 1970: 2). Two approaches are commonly used to resolve the 
problem of natural monopoly: either to allow monopolies to operate山ldera 
system of regulation or to use public ownership to capture rnonopoly rents and 
redistribute the process through state policies (Bhattacharyaya 2011). 
Regulation is a crucial component of the first approach and， in turn， can be 
categorised under three groups: econornic regulation. regulation of anti-cornpet-
itive behaviour and social regulation. The first type is mainly concerned with 
economic efficiency and eqUIty in a non-competitive market environment. 
Restrictions are imposed through the control of price， or quantity， or control of 
entry/exit， etc. The second type is concerned with anti-competitive behaviour 
and designed against anti-cornpetitive practices. The third aims to guard 
against socially undesirable behaviour and promote socially desirable goods 
(Ibid: 649). Reforming a sector百lvolveschanging the rules of the game" 
(institutional environment)，・'...changing the organisational structure by 
abolishingl creating new organizations in line with changed circurnstances. 
rnodifying the governance mechanism and affecting the process of adaptation of 
the institutional arrangement in accordance with new rules on the other. The 
need for changing the rules may arise due to internal or external factors with an 
objective of improving performance. The institutional endowment shapes the 
first while the organizational structure and mode of transaction would influence 
the adaptability" (Ibid: 689). 
Typically. utilities are vertically integrated monopolies (VIM). Some 
advantages of vertical integration include better harmonisation of sometimes 
conflicting interests， facilitation of investment in the electricity network. faster 
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adaptation to changing supply and demand conditions over time， etc. (Joskow 
2006a， 2006b; Williamson 1985; Shen and Yang 2012). Normally， a VIM solely 
performs al four types of activities relating to electricity supply -generation， 
transmission， distribution and retail supply. For a number of reasons， which 
include economies of scale for generation plants， losses wi出 long-distance
transmission， impossibility to duplicate transmission and distribution networks， 
etc.， the transmission and distribution operations are commonly perceived as 
naturally monopolistic (Shen and Yang 2012)， while generation and retail are 
believed to be potentially competitive. Even so， because electricity businesses 
with VIM structure oppose the access of transmission and distribution facilities 
by non-vertically integrated generators and retailers， the electricity market 
remains non-competitive and monopolized even in the segments of generation 
and retail. Walsh and Todeva (2006) observe that. to a degree， a re即 lated
environment itself preserves the existence of VIMs. Since these services are 
provided within a regulated bundled price， the customer had litle opportunity 
to recognize the various costs involved in the service being provided. Regulated 
companies， inturn， have litle incentive to teduce costs to the customer if the 
regulator is convinced that the cost structure is justified. Nonetheless， 
technological improvements (such as smart grids， advancements in new 
sources of electricity generation， etc.) significantly broaden the possibilities for 
competition and shatter the positions of regulated monopolies. 
Let us begin with characterisation of the J apanese electric power industry in 
terms of its structure， technical and economic parameters. 
The Structure of Japan's Electric Power Market 
Accor曲 19to the Federation of Electric Power Companies of J apan (FEPC)， 
electricity was introduced in Japan in 1878. The electric power sector had been 
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rapidly expanding since J apan started modernization. Prior to the WW 1， about 
700 electric utilities were established across the country. The sector's 
reorganization implemented soon after the war merged these companies into 
五velarge utilities. During the WW I， the electric power industry was 
completely state-controlled and the utilities were integrated into a nationwide 
state-owned power generating and transmitting company Nihon Hatsusoden 
Co. and nine distribution companies. In 1951， as part of the post-war 
demilitarization of the J apanese economy， nine regional privately owned 
electricity uti1ties -Hokkaido， Tohoku， Tokyo， Chubu， Hokuriku， Kansai， 
Chugoku， Shikoku and Kyushu Electric Power Companies -were established. 
With the return of Okinawa to J apan in 1972， Okinawa Electric Power Co. joined 
the group of J apanese electricity utilities. These ten monopolized pri-
vately'開・ownedregional electric power companies (regional integrated monopo-
lies， Aoki and Rothwell， 2013) are responsible for the electricity supply in each 
subsequent region (Figure 1). 
Another peculiarity of the electricity market has been painfully realised in 
the aftermath of the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami. Following the 
power failure of the TEPCO-run NPPs in Fukushima some 4.9 
million people in Tohoku region and several thousands of 
consumers in the Tokyo area lost power supply and other densely 
populated and industrialized regions were faced with electricity 
shortages. For many it came as a big surprise that Japan's electric 
grid is not harmonized. Although some electricity generating 
capacity within the quake-intact regions could have been utilized 
to ease the power deficit of Tokyo， itturned out to be technically 
difficult， because while three electric companies in eastern J apan 
(Hokkaido Electric Power， Tohoku Electric Power， and Tokyo 
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Electric Power) operate at 50 Hz. seven other electric companies 
in western J apan (Chubu Electric Power. Hokuriku Electric 
Power. Kansai Electric Power. Chugoku Electric Power. Shikoku 
Electric Power. Kyushu Electric Power. and Okinawa Electric 
Power) adopt 60 Hz. There are only three frequency converters of 
total capacity of about 1 GW built by J-Power. Tokyo Electric 
Power. and Chubu Electric Power. 
Figure 1: Major Electric Utilities in Japan. 
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Source: http://www.asiancompetitionforum. org/download/pdf2∞8/Dl%20S1A_ 
Hiroshi%200hashi.pdf 
The two-standard frequency system is a paradox with a long history. The 
]apanese electricity business started with the foundation of Tokyo Electric 
Lamp Company in 1883. Later， electric light companies were founded 
throughout ]apan and the pioneering Tokyo Electric Lamp instaled power 
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generators imported from Germany for other electric凶npcompanies. Osaka 
Electric Light Company， which was founded in 1888， took an independent pa也
importing 60 Hz alternating-current generators from the U.S. 
The aftermath of the Fukushima incident clearly revealed出atpreservation 
of the domestic electrical grid in this form adversely impacts the Japanese 
economy and， even more， threatens national security. 
Electricity Market Deregulation before 2011 
J apan's early steps towards electricity market deregulation included the 
establishment of the institute of the independent power producers (IPP) in 
December 1995， which enabled electricity wholesale services. The retail supply 
of electricity for extra-high voltage users was liberalized in March 2000， first 
for the demand exceeding 2MW，出en，in April 2004， to users of more出血
500kW， and， finally， inApril2005， for demand of more than 50kW (Figure 2). To 
facilitate the nationwide competition， the J apan Electric Power Exchange 
(JEPE) was established in April 2005. 
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Figure 2: Liberalization of Electricity Retail Supply in Japan. 
辺盟主+ 20但五今 2盟主タ
5亙亙亙
1 I時制何時一
機購鰻彊園鶴40%日XJk'
(6kV) 
1民l%
Rat同d蹴alsaI田oIl0U加融盟
Source: htp:/www.asiancompetitionforum.org/ download/pdf2∞8/Dl%20S1Aー
Hiroshi%200hashi.pdf 
A total of 60 companies have entered the power producers and suppliers 
(PPS) business following the liberalisation of sales of electricity for large-lot 
users in 1999 by the Amendment of the Electricity Business Law (1995) 
Currently， 50 companies registered with the Agency of Natural Resources and 
Energy as PPS， or businesses entitled to sel electricity to large-lot users 
However， according to Yomiuri Shimbun，5l 24 firms are not operating. Many 
PPS companies are facing difficulties in procuring electricity to sel to large-lot 
customers. The pace of new entry into the PPS business has slackened: 11 
companies in 2009 and 13 in 2010 to seven in 2011. Additionally， according to 
5) Half of PPS electricity providers no longer in operation. Yomiuri Shimbun， February 21， 
2012. http:/www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy /national/Tl20223∞7082.htm 
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Fuji Keizai Co. if 2010 saw a three-fold increase in the volume of electricity 
supplied by PPS firms (19.96 billion kWh). 2011 has revealed no change (20.06 
billion kWh). Currently. the PPS supplied volume of electricity covers only 
about 2 percent of the demand. 
Thus. despite the unbundling of generation. transmission and distribution 
has been intended since the mid 1990s. the ]apanese electric power industry 
ret釦lSits vertically integrated structure (Figure 3) due to strong resistance 
from the incumbent utilities (Hosoe and Tanaka 2012). 
Figure 3: Electricity Industry in Japan. 
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In 2011. following the announcement of TEPCO's pl担 toraise the electricity 
charges to large-lot users by an average of 17 percent. many companies and 
more than half of 49 major local governments. including nine prefectures within 
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TEPCO's jurisdiction and centra1 government ordinance-designated cities， 
started considering switching to PPS firms instead of conventiona1 electric 
power companies. The main hindrance， however， islimited electricity supply to 
PPS by the major electric power companies. Having only two NPPs in operation， 
the utilities are forced to limit their wholesa1e sa1es activity. This leads to an 
increase in electricity procurement costs for PPS firms. After the March 11 
disaster， electricity prices on the electric power exchange， infact， soared more 
than threefold to 32.59 yenlkWh on Janu紅 y31， 2012. In an e百Ortto encourage 
electricity supply to PPS firms， the government started considering obliging 
loca1 governments to engage in the open competitive bidding system for 
public-sector electric power projects， such as hydroelectric power generators 
owned by local governments. 
Price and Cost 
In Japan， economics of electricity involves a complex set of issues. As has 
been more fully revea1ed recently， Japan's nuclear power sector， which prior to 
the Fukushima accident contributed about 30 percent of electricity generation， 
had numerous cases of concea1ed accidents at the NPPs. Japanese nuclear 
policy-making in its entirety tended to systematica11y over1ook the issues of 
safety or handle them inappropriately loosely (Shadrina 2012a， 2012b). 
Ordinary Japanese people paid a very high price for such conduct. 0旺icia11y，it 
has not yet been measured in terms of lost lives，6) but the vanished livelihoods. 
contaminated properties and broken lifestyles of those many thousands stil 
6) Albeit the evidences of health complications involving thyroid gland in children of 
Tohoku region are ample < http://truth企equencynews.com/almost-half-of-fukushi. 
ma-children-now-have-thyroid-disorders-up-from-36-in-july I >噌
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unable to return to their homes are the undeniable consequences of the 
Fukushima disaster. 
From the beginnings of nuclear power in J apan， the public has been 
persuaded of the numerous boons of atomic energy. The benefits were often 
inflated to仕leextent that皿yother so山ldoption was almost altogether 
disregarded. Officia11y approved reports emphasized an outstanding cost-effi-
ciency of nuclear energy' while impartia1 information about the costs of 
electricity generation by other sources was largely not available. Needless to 
say， nuclear power generation associated costs， such as on safety management， 
reprocessing and storage of nuclear waste， control over ecological hazards 
associated with nuc1ear power， etc. were hardly adequately accounted. 1t took 
this major nuclear disaster to eventua11y consider the 血ldingsof the previous 
studies wi出 dueattention (Oshima 2010， Matsuo et al. 2011). 
Among the major anti-nuc1ear arguments， there are doubts about the 
cost-efficiency of nuclear energy and the practicalities of the spent fuel 
reprocessing. The actua1 size of government support to nuclear power is 
estimated at some 68.4 percent of the tota1 amount of subsidies provided by the 
nationa1 government to the electric power sector during 1975 -2007. This fact 
a10ne highlights that nuclear power has been treated exceptionally generously?) 
Other aggravating details include the nuclear power plan凶， (NPPs) lower than 
o宜icia11ystated operating e宜'ectiveness.Actual operating levels did not exceed 
70 percent， while oficia1 data estimated it at 80 percent. Also， the NPPs' 
construction and operating costs were higher in actuality than in the oft-cited 
7) 社民党脱原発アクションプログラム2013.原発稼働はただちにゼロに!2050年には自然
エネルq::'-100%へ(Ver5)(Social Democratic Party Action Program 2013. Toward zero 
nuclear power! Towards 10 percent renewable energy by 20501) (Ver5) htゆ://www5
sdp.or必IpolicyIpolicy I energy I datal energy2013_01.pdf 
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pro-forma examples due to the delays in construction and overruns. Taken into 
account， these and other considerations one can reevaluate the estimates of the 
cost of a kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated power (Table 1) 
Table 1: Unit Power Generation Cost by Types of Generating Facilities， yen/ 
kWh 
C回目晶画I pumpiz宅一甲
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Source: Yuji Matsuo， Yu Nagatomi and Tomoko Murakami， Thermal and Nuclear Generations Cost 
Estimates Using Corporate Financial Statements. IE]. October 201. p. 4， htp:/eneken.iej.or. 
jp/ datal4103.pdf 
A reasonable question to pose here is: "Why despite al its economic 
ine出ciencyand enormous ecological hazard， the J apanese government has 
been treating nuclear energy in such a favourable manner?" 
After the Fukushima accident. four out of Japan's 54 nuclear reactors 
became inoperational and 50 other reactors were stopped pending more 
thorough safety examinations in accordance with the newly adopted nuclear 
safety standards. These are carried out under the oversight of the newly 
established Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the latter approves出e
NPPs' appropriateness. In anticipation of an electricity supply shortage during 
the summer of 2012， however， two reactors were restarted (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Operational Status of Nuclear Reactors in Japan， as of January 15， 
2013. 
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Source: htp:/www.japantimes.co.jp/texνnn20120617b4.html 
Other 48 reactors remain 0丘linedue to elevated concerns about active faults 
lying right beneath many of the existing NPPs. Despite a number of completed 
geological surveys indicating that the danger involved is rather serious，8l the 
matter of safety is nonetheless again potentially being overlooked by the NPPs 
and， what is indeed alarming， even by the 0妊icialswithin the newly estab!ished 
8) For some findings refer to: NHK. November 30. 2012 < htp:/www.nhk.or.jp/ja 
pan311/311-nw-121130.html.>; The ]apan Times. December 14.2012くhtp://weekly
j apan times. co.jpl edl n uclear-re gula tion -bod y-de tects-acti ve-faul t-unde r-ts uruga -reac-
tor >; Asahi Shimbun. December 28. 2012 < htp:/ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disast巴r/fu-
kushirnal A]20l21228∞36>; 
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NRA，9) who bluntly keep lobbying for the NPPs' restarts. 
Certainly， the NPPs stoppage resulted in the utilities' increased fue1 costs， as
they needed to reactivate their fossil fueHired generating facilities. The 2011 
企lancialyear ended March 31， TEPCO posted a 10ss of¥1.247 trillion ($15.86 
billion)， the 1argest annua1 net loss in J apanese corporate history.lO) For the year 
ended March 2012， TEPCO posted a net loss of¥781.64 bilion. One of the 1argest 
components of TEPCO's costs is fuel， which reached ¥804 billion in 2011 fiscal 
ye町 andabout ¥2.5 trillion in 2012.11) Consequently TEPCO was forced to seek 
the government's permission to ipcrease the e1ectricity tarif. . 
On Ju1y 20， 2012 the Japanese government endorsed a 8.47 percent 
e1ectricity rate hike for househo1ds by TEPCO， instead of the requested 10.28 
percent increase. Expressing its concern over the Fukushima nuclear accident 
burden being passed on to the customers， the Ministry of Economy， Trade and 
Industry (METI) was seeking more effort by TEPCO in cutting back on their 
expenses (Figure 5) .METI has been asking for an average 30 percent cut in 
TEPCO top 1evel emp1oyees' salaries and reaching a target of 60 percent 
competitive bids in TEPCO's supply procurement over the five years.12) While 
increases in such costs as fue1 and personne1 expenses were allowed to be 
passed on to the households， only a certain level of business returns (to be used 
9) Nuclear watchdog exec held 30 ilicit meetings with power firms// The Japan Times. 
Online February 10， 2013 < http://www.japantimes.co.jp/?s=nuclear + regulation + au・
thority> 
10) TEPCO received several emergency loans from出ebanks and the govenunent (¥l 
tr出on，or $12.5 bilion)， inaddition to approximately about ¥4凶lionin outstanding loans， 
including about ¥2 trilion in emergency loans extended in March 201. 
1) Iwata. M. 2012. Japan to allow TEPCO rate increase. The Wall Street ]ournal. ]uly 19. 
http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10000872396390必4464304577536480328997386.h凶1
12) Nikkei. July 20. 2012. htp:/e.凶kkei.com/e/fr Itnks/Nni20120720D2007N01.htm 
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as interest payments) can be transferred onto customers. Certainly， the 
J apanese government has been attentive to general public sentiment that any of 
the Fukushima disaster-related compensation and cleanup costs occurred over 
the TEPCO's negligence of the necessary nuclear safety measures shall not be 
incurred by the utility's customers. 
Figure 5: TEPCO's Costs and the Japanese Government's Cost Reductions 
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Overall. the decrease and for some time even altogether abandonment of 
nuclear power， which resulted in 44.3 percent decline in nuclear output in 
2011，13) drove up the demand for fossil fuels and cons巴quentlypushed up 
imports. Consequently， according to the Institute of Energy Economics， Japan， 
(IEEJ) ，compared to 2010 levels， in2011 Japan's gas consumption grew by 1l.6 
percent and LNG imports increased by 12.5 percent， while consumption of fue! 
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oil augmented by 29.7 percent. To illustrate the scale of J apan's additional 
financial burden， compared to 2010， the volume of fuel imported by J apan LNG 
was 35.l percent up (while over the same period the U.S. and Canada saw 8.7 
percent and 6 percent down， respectively). In 2011. renewable energy did not 
become any significant substitution for nucle訂 power.Hydropower output 
even shrunk by some 6.7 percent， while other enewables demonstrated modest 
growth of some 3.8 percent (compared to impressive increment of 48.3 percent 
in China， which is now ranked the 3rd in the world after the U.S. and Germany). 
A nuclear-free reality has certainly induced larger expenses for electricity 
suppliers， which， in turn， transformed into a heavier burden for electricity 
consumers. But， as set out above， the price and cost of nuclear energy are not 
the only drivers of J apanese energy policy; a great diversity of issues need to be 
taken into account in the policy-making process. 
Post-Fukushima Policy Shifts 
A stream of research to verify the actual costs of various types of energy 
has been observed in the Fukushima aftermath. To support the policy-making 
process wi也objectiveanalysis， the government established a special body -the 
Cost Verification Committee within the Energy and Environment Council a 
subcommittee under the Council on National StrategyむldPolicy. The 
Committee has been tasked with the examination of the cost of electricity 
generated by different sources. The Committee's findings proved that 
electricity generated at NPPs is no longer the cheapest option.14) The NPP 
13) BP， 2012. Statistical Review of World Energy http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/ 
gIobalbp/ gIobalbp_uk.english/reports_and .lmblications/statistica1_energy Jeview _2011ノ
ST AGING/loca1_assets/pdf/statistica1_review _oC worId_energy JulCreport_2012.pdf 
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generation cost， which was previously estimated at 5.9 yen/ kWh， isrevised to 
8.9 yen/ kWh reflecting the inf!ated construction costs， additional safety costs， 
subsidies extended to the communities hosting the atomic facilities and 
damages identified by the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear accident. With some 
other costs added (such as in the case of accidents. compensation to residents. 
interim storage and permanent disposal costs for contaminated materials. etc.) . 
the cost of NPP generated electricity may even exceed 10 yen/kWh. Costs of 
electricity produced at coalτLN仔 andoil-fired power plants are also revised 
upward. C02 emissions and the rising price of fosil fuels are the main drivers. 
On the other hand， cost of renewable sources is estimated to decline in line with 
technological advancements and liberalization of the electric power market. 
This is a very sigr泊伺ntstep which may sign助 thebeginning of green 
energy era in J apan. J apan has always been a frontrunner in proposing climate 
change policy i凶tiatives.The country， however， started lagging behind many 
developed (and even developing) economies in its pursuit of actual implementa-
tion of climate policy tols. Among the dominant reasons for sluggish 
development were a strong anti-renewables lobby in the government， 
structurally and regionally monopolized electric power industry， etc. According 
to Japan's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE)， in 2010 
renewable energy accounted for only 10 percent of generated electricity. The 
Fukushima accident irreversibly destroyed the image of nuc1ear power as a 
safe option and the government had to intensify its e宜ortsto put into action a 
more adequate policy allowing substitution of atomic energy with authentically 
14) Report on cost verification by the cost verification committee of the energy and 
environment council (Kosuto-to kensh白unkaihokokusho. Enerugi kankyo kaigi. Kosuto-to 
kensho inkai). December 19. 2011. http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/tyokilsakuteilsiryo/sa-
ku同i10/siηTo2-2-3.pdf
48 'fパナンス研究 NO.9 (2013年)
safe， but yet economically feasible and clean sources of energy. Apparently， the 
moment for diverse alternatives is about to come. 
As known， at the September 22， 2009 UN Summit on Climate Change in 
New York the then Prime Minister Hatoyama pledged to introduce Japan's 
emission trading mechanism and a feed-in tariff (FIT) for renewable energy， as
well as to consider a global warming切X.15)The pledges to reduce GHG 
emissions by 25 % below the 1990 levels by 2020 were reiterated in the 
Copenhagen Accord. This， along with a number of the post-Fukushima energy 
policy targets， urged the government to introduce relevant policy mechanisms. 
In the wake of Fukushima， the Expert Committee on Electric Power Reform 
within the METI deliberated on a number of changes in the J apanese electric 
power industry. The resulting proposals envisioned curbing the monopolistic 
status of the electric power companies by unbundling generation and 
transmission of electric power as well as deregulating the retail of power.16) 
Deregulating the retail of energy would enable smaller size energy 
companies to enter the market and compete for consumers. Consumers， inturn， 
would be able to choose their suppliers of electricity. So far， the greatest hurdle 
for smaller energy companies was the major energy companies' control over 
出etransmission of power. If actualized， the reform promises to end the 
monopoly privileges the ten major energy companies have always enjoyed and 
allow renewable energy companies to enter the market. Potentially， there are 
two possible methods for the unbundling of generation and transmission. One 
15) htゆ://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0922_e比ml
16) The new Basic Energy Plan is expected to reflect these provisions. The DPJ 
government intended to endorse the document by summer of 2012， but as at time of writing 
b出ebegiru血gof 2013， it is yet unclear when the new LDP cabinet would complete the 
Plan. 
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suggestion is to create Independent System Operators (ISO) to centralize the 
control and regulation of power grid， electric lines and substations. Another 
proposal is“legal" unbundling， inwhich the major energy companies would be 
required to create holding companies and， under出at，establish subsidiaries for 
generation and transmission. The latter option obviously makes it more di血cult
for smaller energy companies to participate and somewhat preserves出estatus 
quo of the majors' monopoly. 
Recently， there were particularly visible advancements in implementing 
some of the instruments provided in the bil on the Basic Act on Global 
Warming Countermeasures.l7J In particular， a carbon tax in the form of 1 yen 
per litre of petrol introduced in October 2011. As regards an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) ， although the respective bil was submitted to the Diet in 2010 is 
yet to be adopted. The voluntary ETS， for instance， started in 2005 and has 
given rise to much experience in the basic functioning of ETS's. Moreover， in
2008， the experimental introduction of an integrated domestic market of 
emissions trading was launched. 
The reform also means changes in the tarif policy‘If before the tari旺was
decided by the utilities based on their labour and fuel costs with some 
percentage of a profit margin added (the METI， however， approves叩 increase
in electricity charges)， once opened to the competition， the price of a kilowatt of 
electricity is to be defined in the market as the result of interactions between 
the power producers and suppliers. In 2012， the government reviewed the 
utilities' billing methods deciding to set the upper limits for labour costs that can 
be reflected in electricity charges. 
Especially robust developments are observed with the FIT for renewablee-
17) http://www.env.go.jp/en/ earthl cc/bagwcl overview _bill.pdf 
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nergies. In fact， Japan's PV market was created in the early 1970s to assistthe 
nation against its profound dependency on foreign oil. Responding to theoil 
embargo， thegovernment如ldedR&D projects and created policies tosupport 
the development of PV systems. One such program was the Residentia1 
PVSystem Dissemination Program， which provided up-front cash rebates. 
Between1994 and 2005， J apan dominated the world PV market in terms of 
production andinstallation. In 2006， however， the government thought the PV 
market becameself-sufficient and discontinued the residentia1 incentive 
program. Immediately J apan saw a decrease in the annua1 PV market. This 
decline occurred not on1ybecause of lack of incentives， but a1so due to a shortage 
ofdomestica11y-pr吋ucedmodules， since J apanese makers were focused on 
moreprofitable European markets. To revive the market， the government 
resumed theresidentia1 incentive program in January 2009. Since then. the 
J apaneseresidentia1 PV market has been improving. Furthermore， inNovember 
2009， thegovernment initiated a Net FIT policy (purchasing on1y excess 
generatedelectricity， instead of purchasing a11 generated electricity). requiring 
largeelectric power utilities to buy excess electricity generated by PV systems 
at apremium rate. The main reason for ]apan to introduce the Net FIT policy 
was toincentivize energy conservation and to limit the program cost burden 
which issh紅 edby al electricity ratepayers. Many households are qua1ified not 
onlyfor nation-wide incentives. but a1so for subsidies and loans provided by 
theloca1 governments. 
In August 2011. the ]apanese Diet adopted The Act on Special Measures 
Concerning the Procurement of Renewable Electric Energy by Operators of 
Electric Utilities. Under the Act，18) the Japanese electric utility operators are 
obligated to purchase solar， wind， hydro， geotherma1 and biomass generated 
electricity for contractua1 terms and at prices to be fixed by the FIT 
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price-setting council under the METI. Like也eexisting surplus electricity 
purchase system， costs required for purchasing wil be added to electricity 
charges in the form of surcharges， which wil be borne by electricity users. The 
Act took effect from July 2012 and wil remain in force until March 31，2021. The 
document is stipulated to be revised every three years and in the event that the 
Basic Act on Energy Policy or the Basic Energy Plan undergoes any relevant 
changes. 
The FIT system requires J apanese utilities to buy electricity from 
renewable sources such as solar， wind and geothermal at pre-set premiums for 
up to 20 years. Costs are passed on to consumers through higher bils. The 
government pays 42 yen (53 U. S. cents) per kilowatt hour (kWh) for 
solar-generated electricity (double the tarif 0在eredin Germany and more than 
three times that paid in China). Wind power wil be subsidized at 23.10 yen/ 
kWh for plants with capacity greater than 20kW and 57.75 yen/ kWh for 
smaller plants (compared wi出 4.87euro cents (6 U.S. cents) in Germany). 
The J apanese PV market is unique in the degree to which it has been built 
upon the residential market. The dominance of the residential sector remains 
strong， accounting for 86 percent of the total market in 2011， according to NPD 
Solarbuzz's PV Market Quarterly Asia Pacific. The residential segment is 
project凶 todominate domestic PV demand， al也oughits share would decrease 
gradually after the non-residential segment st訂 tsto t~e-off with the new FIT 
launched in J uly 2012. 
The government's generous stimuli have created considerable interest in 
the J apanese sector. Both domestic and foreign manufacturers see the 
18) http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy I energy _environmentlrenewable/pdfl sum-
mぽy201109.pdf
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opportunities opening up. From July 1. 2012， large solar insta11ations went online 
in Kyoto (by Softb出J.k-foundedSB Energy)， Gunma， Niigata and Fukuoka 
prefectures. Kyocera Corp. plans to construct a 70 MW solar facility in 
Kagoshima Prefecture. Mitsui Chemicals Inc. and other firrns also intend to 
start work on a solar and wind power station. Solar panel makers， such as 
Panasonic Corp and Sharp Corp and solar project insta11er Sekisui Chernicals， 
a10ng with wind farm developers such as Toyota Tsusho and Japan Wind 
Developrnent have rnoved into the business. The Chinese solar cornpanies are 
also increasingly active. Chaorisolar Energy Science and Technology -a 
photovoltaic products maker -and Sky Solar Holdings -a solar farm builder 
plan to develop 100 MW of solar projects in J apan in 2012. Among other 
companies moving into the sector is Trina Solarand Suntech Power Holdings 
Co， the world's largest solar cels maker in the world targets at 10 percent of the 
Japanese rnarket. Canadian Solar Inc and Q-Cells also plan to build and operate 
solar farms in Japan. In 2011， Japan had 1.2 GW of solar capacity; this number 
was projected to increase by 40 percent in 2012. According to the Agency for 
Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE)， 44 solar and wind power facilities with 
a combined output of 41.605 KW were approved to join the FIT system in J uly 
2012. 
Another opportunity lies with geo-thermal generation. J apan is one of the 
world's largest holders of geo-therrnal resources， but produces only 530 MW of
geo-thermal energy， which is equivalent to 0.3 percent of the total electricity 
generation. One of the objective obstacles for more active development of the 
geo-thermal generation is that suitable natural sources are often located in the 
national parks where construction and industrial activity is restricted， or in the 
areas used for hot spring tourism. There are， however， certain moves towards 
more active use of land within the national parks and new technologies (such as 
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hot dry rock geo-thermal power (HDR) or enhanced geo-thermal systems 
(EGS)) enabling geo-thermal generation in a manner harmless for the hot 
springs.19) 
Overall， the J apanese government incentives promise to enhance 
development of renewable energy.20) Before March 11， 2011， renewable sources 
apart from large hydro-electric power plants accounted for only 1 percent of 
power supply. It is expected now that solar capacity would increase to about 19 
GW by 2016 from about 5 GW before J uly 2012， while wind capacity may reach 
7.6 GW in four years. Additionally， at the beginning of 2012， the J apanese 
government granted access to national parks for geothermal developers to 
conduct surveys and build geothermal plants. The parks contain an estimated 
80 percent of Japan's estimated 23 GW of geothermal resources. The Japanese 
government is also funding development of novel options for renewable energy. 
Those include floating offshore turbines adapted to Japan's deep coastal waters. 
Marubeni and Tokyo University are leading an industrial consortium funded by 
the METI出atplans to install three floating wind turbines totalling 16 MW in
capacity some 20 to 40 kilometres offshore of Fukushima Prefecture， aswell as 
the wor1d's first 66，000-volt floating power substation. 
Discussion. Transition or U-turn? 
Analysis of the post-Fukushima domestic energy policy path requires 
19) Hasegawa， M.， 2012. Japan moves a step c10ser to reform energy industry. The Japan 
Daily Pres. July 14. http://japandailypress. com/japan-moves-a-step-c1oser-to-re-
form-energy-industry-146608 
20) Ernst & Young， 2012.Renewabl巴energyco皿住yattractiveness indices. Issue 3. htp: 
I Iwww.ey.com/Publication/vwLU Assets/Renewable_energy _country _attractiveness_in-
dices_ -_Issue_33/$FILE/EY _RECAUssue_33.pdf 
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consideration of a number of variables including such as the changing character 
of the government's role in the energy sector， the process of energy policy 
transition and the resilience to energy policy change. 
Government Role 
Typically， government intervenes in an economy for three kinds of reasons: 
(1) tactical (to control and maintain public law and administration); (2) 
strategic (to correct allocation ine宜icienciesand market failures); and (3) 
historical (to sustain historical and cultural traditions) (Samuels 1987). As 
depicted by Samuels， energy sectors in industrial democracies involve complex 
interactions among market structure， centralized state power， developmental 
timing and finance， openness， and the nature of ruling coalitions and 
administrative traditions. These factors result in a commercial and competitive 
presence for the industrial state in the energy market place. To Samuels， 
electric power plays a major role in the structure of domestic markets. One of 
the principal conceptions underpinning Samuels' work is the politics of 
reciprocal consent. In case of J apan， Samuels holds that in consensual processes 
the J apanese state acts as a guarantor to private energy businesses，“…because 
its power in the market place is enhanced and circumscribed simultaneously by 
the routines of mutual accommodation'" [in whichJ the Japanese bureaucracy 
does not dominate， itnegotiates. [This results inJ…the routinization of 
economic policy which the durability of elites and their constituencies makes 
possible" (Samuels 1987， 260). 
In his seminal work on Japan's post-war reconstruction， Johnson (1982) 
contends that industrial renaissance was a consequence of出eefforts for a 
rational state plan. The essential prerequisite for managing the developmental 
process at the time was the existence of a pilot agency日 MITI(Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry). which directed the course of development 
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through the devising and emp10ying a range of policy to01s to ensure that 
indigenous business is nurtured and managed in the overa11 nationa1 interest. 
The agency， which changed its name to METI in 2001. has increased its 
notoriety for being one of the inviolable strongholds of the J apanese nuclear 
sector and one of the key residents of the "nuc1ear village". It is， therefore， 
absolutely justi五edthat in the course of the post-Fukushima energy policy 
reform， regulation of nuclear power safety was shifted to a newly established 
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). 
The understanding of Japan's model of energy governance would be 
incomplete if its traditiona1 practices are excluded from the ana1ysis (Shadrina 
20l2a). Colignon and Usui (2003) work on amakudari displays an elaborate 
socia1 institution， tightly interlinked with other practices such as yokosuberi， 
wataridori， seikai tensin， etc.21) Among the most notorious practices embedded 
in Japanese nuclear energy policy-making are amakudari (descent from 
heaven) and amaagari (accent to heaven)， an ilega1 revolving door between 
the Japanese government and corporations. On amakudari， Colington and Usui 
(2003) hold that one of the reasons it survives is because the centra1 
bureaucracy needs it. Because the centra1 bureaucracy is sma1l. many projects 
need to be outsourced and here various industry associations and public 
corporations are relied on. MITI/METI is known for active1y seeking advice 
from large business entities and even requiring such an interaction on a 
near-constant basis (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002). In the energy sector， as 
21) Colignon and Usui (203) describe several paths a go刊 rnmentretir巴巴 canfolow 
moving into profit-making enterprises (strict amakudari and subject to legal restrictions); 
moving into public corporations (yokosuberi or“sideslip"); successive appointments in the 
public or private sectors (ωatari冶rior“migratory bird"); or moving into the political 
world. for example. by becoming election candidat巴to也eDiet (seikai tensin). 
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Lesbirel (1998: 22) pointed out， although the MITI“has legal jurisdiction over 
markets， private utilities -not public au出orities-plan and develop energy 
facilities in J ap皿
Traditional practices proved e宜icientat the early developmental stage， but 
this adherence has finally started turning vicious， restraining necessary 
transformations， constraining economic dynamics and dirninishing the e伍-
ciency of J apanese economy. Despite the general public overall dissatisfaction 
with the traditional J apおleseinformal institutions and mechanisms of 
policy-making， they survive. Since 2000，也epower companies have sent at least 
100 employees to central government bodies， inparticular to the Nuclear Safety 
Commission and other 0宜icesinvolved in safety at NPPs. TEPCO， which has 
sent 32 workers to the government， had reserved seats at several positions. By 
the same token， 68 former industry ministry 0伍cialswith extensive nuclear 
industry oversight roles have moved to postretirement jobs as executive board 
members or advisers at 12 of the major power companies over the past five 
decades. As of 2 May 2011， there were stil 13 of these former ministry 0宜icials
working at TEPCO and 10 ensconced at other power companies.22) The March 
1， 2011 natural disaster， nonetheless. clearly revealed a repulsing na加reof 
amakudari-based policy-mall:ing in one particular segment of the J apanese 
economy -nuclear power. The shock and trauma， which the J apanese 
population experienced because of the Fukushima accident. resulted in a strong 
erosion of the public trust to the government. In the aftermath of 3/11， there is a 
number of moves suggesting that amakudari is no longer to remain a central 
2) Nuclear crisis: how ithappened. 'Nuclear power vilage' a cosy. closed community. Daily 
y omiuri Onlin巴 Jun巴16.2011 < http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy /national/Tl10615005652 
htm> 
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出readof J apanese power structure 
Policy， as Hall rightly observes， rnore often “responds less directly to social 
and econornic conditions than it does to the consequences of past policy" (1993: 
277). Norrnally， policy changes are the results of social learning “・.asa 
deliberate atternpt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past 
experiences and new inforrnation." (Ibid: 278). Moreover， policy changes take 
place at di旺erentlevels， such as policy instrurnents， instrurnent settings， and the 
hierarchy of goals behind policy， which Hall refers to as the changes of first， 
second and third order. Typically， first and second order changes to policy are 
associated with the process of social learning， while the rnagnitude of third 
order changes invokes policy paradigrn (Kuhn 1962) change. Strong and 
influential in policy-rnaking， the paradigrns， according to Hall， play especially 
deterrninative role in the areas involving “highly technical issues as well as a 
body of specialized knowledge，" such as energy policy (Ibid: 291). J apan's 
post-Fukushirna electricity rnarket deregulation can be exemplified as a case of 
policy paradigrn sh証t.
Transition 
Transition studies is a relatively young area of research， theoretical and 
empirical aspects of which have been pioneered by Dutch researchers (Kernp 
1994， 2010; Geels 2002， 2011; Loorbach 2007， Loorbach et al. 2008). Successful 
application of transition theory in reforming such sectors as energy， transport， 
agricul回re，etc. in the Netherlands and the UK would seem to have proved its 
credibility. 
For transition to succeed， itneeds to be driven by a central idea. In energy 
transitions， innovations increasingly act as such a central pilar (Geels and Schot 
2007; Grin et al. 2010; Grubler 2012). Wide-scale socio-technical transitions 
facilitate the development of path-breaking innovative niches with rapid 
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implications (Figure 6). which destabilize incumbent policy regimes opening up 
the opportunities for even more radical change. The impulses to the innovation 
system can be distinguished in three ways: the visioning in the sub-trajectories. 
which includes active involvement of business. governments. societal organiza-
tions and knowledge institutes and results in a shared sense of direction; the 
formation of novel coalitions (even among those previously at conflict) and the 
development of niche markets. 
Figure 6: Multi-Ievel Perspective on Transitions. 
Incn:asing structuration 。fa低ivities担loca1practices 
Source: Geels 2002: 1263 
A socio-tecbnical regime. which is a "relatively stable configuration of 
institutions. techniques and artefacts. as well as rules. practices and networks 
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that determine the 'normal' development and use of technologies" (Smith et al. 
2005: 1493)， undergoes transitions that are either intended and purposively 
governed， orunintended and contingent outcomes of historical processes (Geels 
叩 dSchot 2007). Exemplifying the case of the electricity-generating regime， 
Smith et al. expl必ns由at“[aJt a relatively high level of aggregation" it is 
"dominated by rules and practices relating to centra1ised， large-scale (usually 
thermal) power technology and high voltage alternating current grid 
infrastructures(Smith et al. 2005: 1493). Consumption patterns and supportive 
institutional arrangements reinforce these patterns of energy utilisation. At the 
lower level of aggregation of individual power technologies， the electricity 
generating regime as a whole spans of a variety of subordinate regimes， such as 
that based on the coal-fired steam turbine， the nuclear fuel cycle， large-scale 
hydroelectricity or gas-fired combined cycle turbine systems. Within the 
emerging niche for renewable generated electricity， a network of spec出c
practices， such as solar and wind energy utilisation， isdeveloping. These are 
encompassed by the electricity regime as a whole. 
In his historical analysis of energy transitions， Grubler (2012) provides three 
important observations about: 1) the importance of energy end-use in driving 
energy transitions; 2) the slow rates of changes in the beginning of transition 
process， which tend加 acceleratefrom early to late adopters; and 3) energy 
transitions being driven by the scaling up of technological solutions， which start 
o宜initialyas small， imperfect， and costly， but whose long-term growth leads to 
transitions at the macro-level. Based upon these insights， Grubler suggests that 
success in designing the policies is a result of: 1) persistence and continuity of 
policies (long-run perspective); 2) alignment of policies (t出inginto account 
the multitude of actors and different mechanisms to nurture change); and 3) 
balance in innovation portfolios and policies (diversification is the only feasible 
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strategy to hedge against innovations uncertainties and risks). 
As exemplified earlier， transition of energy policy in J apan has been stirred 
up by a shock outside of incumbent regime and was followed by a response from 
regime actors. Not on1y the socio-technical regime (nuclear power) was 
destabilised; the overall socio-technical landscape has been undermined. Such 
traditional deeply rooted in J apanese energy policy-making cultural patterns as 
amakudari have been seriously challenged. On macro-economic level， the 
deregulation reform has started progressing at a higher tempo. Sector of 
renewable energy in J apan has reacted to a number of micro-economic stimuli 
showing potential of becoming the locomotive for energy transition and opening 
up the horizons for wide-range transformations from innovative and 
technological solutions in energy sector itself to institutional and regulatory 
arrangements across the sectors. Additionally， although the political discourse 
remained of the scope of this analysis， itneeds to be pointed out出atthe LDP's 
triumph in the December 2012 parliamentary elections and the party's re加rnto
power to a certain degree can also be read as a sign of transition involving the 
exogenous (as relates energy policy making) context. 
Group Interests 
The concept of group interests (Weber 1947: Olson 1971) has gained a 
particular prominence in the studies on the contemporary Japanese energy 
policy (LesbireI1990， 1998: DeWit2011b: DeWit and Kaneko 2011; Moe 2012). A 
closed relatz'onsh砂，as Weber (1947) puts it， isa relationship冶gainstoutsiders 
氏accordingto its meaning-content and the validity of its order， participation of 
certain persons is excluded， limited， or subjected to conditions." 23) Three 
principal motives for a closure of a relationship can be identified:也e
23) Weber， M. 1962. Basic Conce，ρぉinSociology. The Citadel Pres. 
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maintenance of quality， which is often combined with the interest in prestige 
and the consequent opportunities to enjoy honor， and even profit; orientation to 
the scarcity of "consumption opportunity"; and orientation to the scarcity of" 
profit-making opportunities". Usually， the motives combine. 
Lesbirel's analysis of the Japanese politics of the si白19of electricity 
generating facilities， aka NIMBY (not in my back yard) politics (1990， 1998) 
focuses on ρrotective grou.ρ'S. Drawing on the concepts of con日ict.bargaining， 
and compensation as the means to resolve environmental disputes. Lesbirel 
notes that J apanese energy siting history highIights the diversity in the 
structure of bargaining environments. power relationships， and the effective-
ness of conflict resolution mechanisms. His analysis of energy siting processes 
and outcomes suggests that“in siting. negotiators and leaders often respond to 
changed circumstances and develop innovative approaches and strategies to 
deal with political siting problems... [they]，“often work privately behind the 
scenes… [whereJ they do develop sophisticated strategies for dealing with 
highly complex conflictual situation" (Lesbiel 1998: 151-52). 
W ork by Moe (2012) is of particular interest for the analysis of由e
post-Fukushima energy policy. Distinguishing between protective and 
promoting types of vested interests as regards the J apanese renewable energy 
policy (wind energy versus solar energy). the author elaborates the 
propositions made in his earlier volume (Moe 2007). Drawing on Schumpeter's 
(1983) evolutionary economics where structural economic change -the key 
element to long-term economic growth and development -is described through 
the changes in the role of， and relationship between， technology and institutions， 
and Olson's (1982) notion of interest groups and vested interests. which resist 
any kind of structural change， Moe (2007: 25) proposes that in order to enable 
the destruction of old inefficient industries and promote potentially promising 
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industries the role of the state “is to ensure白atno vested interests become so 
powerful and influential that they can effectively block the process of creative 
destruction." 24) 
Taking up the question proposed in the title of this section:“Transition or 
U-turn?"， the following quotations seem to be worth reflecting on: 
“1nstead olthe domination by the incumbent Democratic Party 01 
Ja，μnのIPJ)，the Liberal Democratic Parか(LDP)took a majority 01 
seaおinthe House of Reρresentatives， thus becoming the rulingρarty 01 
lゆanonce again... [TJ he 1nnovative Strategy lor Energy and the 
Environrnent， whichρrotoses discontinuing nuclearρower by 2030， 
involves too rnαnyρroblems.阪乍believeit should be reviewed under the 
new administration and rnod折edωsuρorta more realistic energy 
ρolicy. "お)
“'As a result 01 the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station 01 the Tokyo Electric Power Co.， 1nc. 
(TEPCO)，μ。ρle包confidencein Jaρan's energy ρolicy，ρarticularly 
regarding nuclear saj切"has been lundamentally damaged. Turmoil in 
24) The term ‘creative destruction'， aka 'Schumpeter、gale'，is most associated with 
Schumpeter， who introduced it in a book Capi品'alism，Socialism and Democracyβ942). 
Schump巴terexplicit1y derived the term form from Karl Marx's works and popularized it 
describing the disruptive process of transformation出ataccompanies economic innovations 
in business cycles. 
25) Makoto Yagi， Chairman of Fed巴rationof Electric Power Companies. Comm巴ntson出巴
Result of the General Election for the Members of the House of Representatives. December 
17， 2012， http://www.fepc.or.jp/englisνnews/message/.一icsFiles/afield五lel.加12/12/17/
press_E_20l21217.pdf 
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natz'onal debates on the subsequent Innovatz've Strategy lor Energy and 
the Environment is mostly attributable ωlack 01 mutual trust in 
relationshiPs among the government， regulatory authorities， nuclear 
operators， specialists/e.ゅerts，sitz'ng municipalities and the general 
ρublic. Our keen e.ゅectationand high hope is that the new government 
ωil make restoration 01 conjidence the highest priority.リ6)
“Although societal circumstances surrounding nuclear ρower 
remain severe， the new LDP government seeks aρragmatic， responsible 
approach ωenergy and nuclear ρoweηso it is e.ゆectedthat nuclear 
ρower抑 nts(NPPs)， whose s，ゆか hasbeen coが:rmedbased on new 
saj均Istandards， will be restarted one by one with local understandin，ι 
α'gain contributing to stableρower sutρlies nationwide. The Advisory 
Committee lor Natural Resources and Ene初 Iis also e場ectedto 
progress toward issuance 01 the Basic Plan lor Energy Supply and 
Demand (known commonlyω the Bα.SZ・cEnergy Plan)." 27) 
Moear郡lesthat“political consensus and/or socia! cohesion in peop!e make 
it easier to promote structural economic change. that is. making decisions that 
are in the interest of society at large. going against those of vested interests" 
(加07:23). In Japan. however， the danger出atthe new LDP cabinet would 
26) Takuya Hattori， President， Japan Atomic Industrial Forum， Inc.， E瓦P巴ctationsfor the 
New Administration -Restore People's Confidence， December 17， 2012， http://www.j必f.or.
jp/ english/news_images/pdfIENGNEWS02_135599867 4P.pdf 
27) Opposition LDP Wins Overwhelrning Victory in Election， Sending Ruling DPJ to 
Crushing Defeat: Pragmatic Approach to Nuclear Policy Expected， JAIF， 27 December， 
2012， http://www.j副i.or.jp/eng!is}ν 
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resume its patronage of the notorious vested interests backtracking on the DPJ 
initiated reform looms high. This， in turn， would mean也atthe public concerns 
would be left unattended and its requests ignored. 
Conclusion 
Studies on the triple catastrophe of March 11， 2011 detailing geological and 
seismological specifics of也e2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Norio et 
al.2011)肌 dcharacterizing the parameters of the nuc!ear crisis (Sciubba 2011; 
Funabashi and Kitazawa 2012) help grasp the scale of the disaster Japan was 
faced with then勾 Perhaps，one of the most important contributions of these 
studies is the creation of awareness也atthere is no room for thinking出at
something is "unthinkable" when it comes to the nature and the be!ief that 
“absolute safety" is attainab!e is an absolute myth. 
One of the most important !essons which Japan learnt at a very expensive 
28) Aoki and Rothwell (2013) list six reports reviewing insights from the Fukushima 
accident and deriving regulatory implications; theseぽ巴"InvestigatingCommittee on the 
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company，" 
formed by the Cabinet on June7， 2011; chaired by Prof. Yotaro Hatamura. Interim Report 
and Fina1 Report published on December 26， 2011 and July 23， 2012; "Commission for 
Investigating the Management and Financia1 State of TEPCO，" formed by the Cabinet on 
May 24， 2011; chaired by Kazuhiko Shimokobe. Report published on October 3， 2011; 
"Independent Investigation Committee on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident，" formed by 
the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) on October14， 2011; chaired by Dr， Koichi 
Kitazawa. Report published in February 2012; "TEPCO's Committee for Investigating the 
Fukushima Nuclear Disast巴r，"formed by TEPCO on June 21， 2011; chaired by Masao 
Yamazaki， then-ViαPresident of TEPCO. RepOrt published on June 20， 2012;“Nationa1 
Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission" 
(NAIIC)， formed by the Diet of Japan on October 7， 2011; chaired by Prof. Kiyoshi 
Kurokawa Report published J uly 5， 2012;“The Near Term Task Forc巴"， formed by the U. 
S. NRC. Report published in July 2011. 
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price is that national energy policy needs to be designed as an undividable 
element of national security. And this needs to be understood in a manner 
overcoming the scope of Japan's traditional interpretation of energy security， 
provision of which is mainly perceived in terms of stable， affordable and reliable 
energy supply， and mainly with the reference to the externally procured energy 
resources. The Fukushima accident exposed that the most problematic and 
requiring the government's utmost attention and robust e宜'ortsare the issues of 
domestic energy safety. The laUer should not be perceived narrowly， limited 
strictly to securing nuclear safety standards. Rather， itrequires a more 
comprehensive approach whereby considerations of energy safety wou1d 
involve not only technical and technological aspects， but also economic and 
ecological dimensions. 
Indeed， inthe wake of出eFukushima disaster the J apanese government 
significantly advanced nuclear energy safety regu1ations (Shadrina 20l2a， 
20l2b) and made a remarkable progress towards electricity market deregula-
tion and renewable energy development. These two noteworthy shifts could 
promise a genuine transition in the J apanese energy policy. But the reality is 
that less than two years after the Fukushima， the J apanese energy policy is at 
the crossroads again. The choice to be made by the newly-established LDP 
cabinet is between the continuing the DPJ -drawn path towards a greener， 
economically sound and innovation-intensive energy or turning back to a 
perplex energy policy-making process where vested interests do not allow 
contesting the obscure boons of nuclear energy. As the quotations above 
evidence， a danger of the U-turn in energy policy is real. 
This paper attempted to reflect the course of reforms initiated in J apan's 
energy policy under the DPJ administration. Objectively， the progress made in 
the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster is impressive. Despit泡 theneed for 
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energy policy reform has been ripe since long ago and some initial steps in that 
direction have been undertaken， the critical impulse for changes was generated 
by the March 11， 2011 natural catastrophe. It is important now that the 
] apanese government keeps the transition momentum so that al feasible 
initiatives could combine and reinforce each other informing genuinely 
comprehensive， genuinely coherent， genuinely efficient -]apan's NEW energy 
policy. 
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